讲座题目：Nurturing Young Public Firms over Real Business Cycles
内容摘要：In this paper I develop a theory of financial intermediation in a general equilibrium environment, to study the interactions between households, financial intermediation, and entrepreneurs over real business cycles. In my model the financial intermediary, who resembles real-life private equity (PE) groups and investment bankers, works as a nurturer of young public firms. It performs screening and sorting on entrepreneurs, then allocates resources to them, borrowed from the households. However, the effort intensity in screening decreases when the financial intermediary is flooded by resources, so do the average quality of financial services and the commission rate, which predict the countercyclicality of those variables. This countercyclicality of efficiency in the financial sector promises a dampening effect on economic volatility. I use the U.S. initial public offering (IPO) data, as well as selected PE data to document that the commission rate is indeed countercyclical. Its correlation with the cyclical component of total output is around -0.21. I calibrate the model to the U.S. financial market and conduct several counterfactual exercises. I find that a 20% drop in the financial intermediary’s effort cost dampens the total output volatility by 0.24% and the household consumption volatility by 0.53%. While a binding commission rate cap amplifies the volatility by 0.36% and 0.54% respectively.